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NOTES 
VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL 
OF TIME-BARRED CLAIMS 
Danielle Calamari* 
 
Both state and federal courts have procedural rules that allow a plaintiff 
to voluntarily dismiss a claim without prejudice and then to refile it within 
the applicable statute-of-limitations period.  However, a plaintiff’s right to 
this procedural avenue is not absolute, and courts maintain broad 
discretion in deciding whether to dismiss a claim with or without prejudice.  
If a court allows a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss a time-barred claim 
without prejudice, the plaintiff may be able to refile the claim in a 
jurisdiction with a longer statute of limitations.  As a result, the defendant 
loses the ability to assert a statute-of-limitations defense in subsequent 
litigation.  Courts disagree about whether the defendant’s loss of a statute-
of-limitations defense constitutes “clear legal prejudice” sufficient to bar 
voluntary dismissal without prejudice. 
This Note explores this disagreement.  First, it examines the two ways 
courts currently decide motions for voluntary dismissal of time-barred 
claims.  Next, it argues that both approaches overlook a fundamental 
factor:  res judicata (claim preclusion).  Specifically, courts do not consider 
that statute-of-limitations dismissals are not claim preclusive in every 
jurisdiction.  To account for the differences in preclusion law, this Note 
proposes that, as a threshold inquiry, courts should determine what the 
claim-preclusive effect of a statute-of-limitations dismissal would be.  
Based on this determination, a court can decide whether the loss of a 
statute-of-limitations defense results in “clear legal prejudice” to the 
defendant and whether a dismissal without prejudice is warranted. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When a plaintiff files a lawsuit in a jurisdiction where the applicable 
statute of limitations has expired, the case is not necessarily over.  The 
plaintiff may be able to voluntarily dismiss the action and then refile it in a 
jurisdiction with a longer statute of limitations.1  Courts have broad 
discretion to dismiss an action with or without prejudice.2  A plaintiff can 
only refile a claim in another jurisdiction if the court dismisses the first 
claim without prejudice.3  Courts generally will allow a plaintiff to dismiss 
a claim without prejudice so long as the defendant will not suffer “clear 
legal prejudice” as a result.4 
If a plaintiff’s claim is time barred and a court dismisses it without 
prejudice, the defendant loses the ability to assert a statute-of-limitations 
defense in a subsequent lawsuit in another jurisdiction.5  Courts disagree 
about whether a defendant’s loss of a statute-of-limitations defense 
 
 1. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a); infra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 2. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2); see also, e.g., Metro. Fed. Bank of Iowa, F.S.B. v. W.R. 
Grace & Co., 999 F.2d 1257, 1262–63 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 3. See infra notes 16–18 and accompanying text. 
 4. See, e.g., Metro. Fed. Bank, 999 F.2d at 1262; see also infra Part I.B. 
 5. See, e.g., Metro. Fed. Bank, 999 F.2d at 1262–63. 
2016] VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL 791 
constitutes clear legal prejudice to the defendant.6  For this reason, courts 
are similarly divided on whether to allow a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss a 
time-barred claim without prejudice.7 
Defendants vigorously oppose plaintiffs’ use of voluntary dismissal to 
save time-barred claims.  Instead, they typically ask courts to dismiss the 
claim with prejudice or on statute-of-limitations grounds.8  A defendant’s 
goal through either procedure is to achieve finality through res judicata9—
i.e., a final judgment on the merits that precludes the plaintiff from refiling 
the same claim against the defendant in a subsequent lawsuit.10  A 
plaintiff’s goal is precisely the opposite.  A plaintiff wants the claim 
dismissed without prejudice so she can refile it in another jurisdiction with 
a longer statute of limitations.11 
There are two dominant approaches to resolving these competing 
interests.  Some courts apply a bright-line rule that a plaintiff may not 
voluntarily dismiss a time-barred claim without prejudice and refile it in 
another jurisdiction.12  Under this approach, a defendant’s loss of a statute-
of-limitations defense constitutes “per se legal prejudice” sufficient to bar 
voluntary dismissal without prejudice.13  Other courts apply a balancing test 
and purport to consider the defendant’s loss of the statute-of-limitations 
defense as one of many factors.14 
This Note assesses how courts analyze voluntary dismissals of time-
barred claims.  It considers whether courts should allow a plaintiff to 
voluntarily dismiss a time-barred claim without prejudice and then refile it 
in a jurisdiction with a longer statute of limitations.  It concludes that the 
answer is “sometimes” and that courts should analyze this question as a 
claim-preclusion problem to determine when dismissal without prejudice is 
warranted and when it is not. 
Part I of this Note provides background information on the voluntary 
dismissal rule and statutes of limitations.  Part II analyzes the two 
approaches courts use to decide motions for voluntary dismissal of time-
barred claims.  Finally, Part III argues that the current approaches are 
flawed because neither accounts for the fact that statute-of-limitations 
dismissals are not always claim preclusive.  Consequently, courts reach 
inefficient and misleading results.  To resolve this issue, this Note proposes 
that, as a threshold inquiry, courts should determine what the claim-
preclusive effect of a statute-of-limitations dismissal would be.  Based on 
 
 6. See, e.g., Arias v. Cameron, 776 F.3d 1262, 1274 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting 
disagreement among courts). 
 7. See id. 
 8. See, e.g., id. at 1266; Metro Fed. Bank of Iowa, F.S.B. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 793 F. 
Supp 205, 206 (D. Minn. 1992), aff’d, 999 F.2d 1257. 
 9. See, e.g., Metro. Fed. Bank, 999 F.2d at 1262. 
 10. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). 
 11. See, e.g., id. 
 12. See infra Part II.A. 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
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the answer, a court can determine whether a bright-line rule or a balancing 
test is appropriate in that jurisdiction. 
I.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL 
AND STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS 
Understanding this issue requires basic background knowledge on 
voluntary dismissal and statutes of limitations.  Part I.A provides an 
overview of the voluntary dismissal rule.  Next, Part I.B discusses the legal 
standard courts apply in deciding motions for voluntary dismissal without 
prejudice.  Part I.C then turns to an overview of the purpose and policy 
behind statutes of limitations.  Part I.D concludes with a discussion of the 
choice-of-law rules that determine which statute of limitations governs a 
particular claim. 
A.  An Overview of Voluntary Dismissal 
When a plaintiff chooses to dismiss a lawsuit, the court has broad 
discretion to dismiss the claim(s) either with or without prejudice.15  A 
dismissal with prejudice bars the plaintiff from bringing the same claim in a 
subsequent lawsuit.16  A dismissal without prejudice puts the plaintiff in the 
same legal position as if she never filed the action.17  The plaintiff may thus 
refile the same lawsuit within the applicable statute-of-limitations period.18 
At common law, a plaintiff had an absolute right to voluntarily dismiss a 
claim without prejudice any time prior to judgment or verdict.19  Courts 
developed this rule to protect plaintiffs from losing meritorious claims on 
technical grounds under the strict common law pleading regime.20  There 
was, however, an important limitation on this absolute right:  a plaintiff 
could not voluntarily dismiss a claim without prejudice when doing so 
would be “manifestly prejudicial” to the defendant.21  Courts found such 
prejudice in cases where a defendant was reasonably entitled to a judgment 
on the merits, or when a defendant sought affirmative relief and a dismissal 
would bar the defendant’s pending counterclaim or cross-claim.22 
 
 15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2) (“Unless the order states otherwise, a dismissal under 
this paragraph (2) is without prejudice.”); see also, e.g., Arias v. Cameron, 776 F.3d 1262, 
1268 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 16. E.g., Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 327 (1955); Nemaizer v. 
Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 17. E.g., LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 1976). 
 18. See id. 
 19. In re Skinner & Eddy Corp., 265 U.S. 86, 92–93 (1924). 
 20. See Note, Absolute Dismissal Under Federal Rule 41(a):  The Disappearing Right of 
Voluntary Nonsuit, 63 YALE L.J. 738, 738 (1954).  This rule reflected the notion that a 
plaintiff was the “master of his case until a judgment was rendered.” JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL 
ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 463 (5th ed. 2015). 
 21. See Pullman’s Palace Car Co. v. Cent. Transp. Co., 171 U.S. 138, 146 (1898). 
 22. See, e.g., id. 
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The enactment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) and comparable 
state rules23 significantly limited a plaintiff’s absolute right to voluntarily 
dismiss a claim without prejudice.  Rule 41(a)(1) allows a plaintiff to 
voluntarily dismiss a claim without prejudice at any time before the 
defendant serves an answer or a motion for summary judgment.24  While 
Rule 41(a)(1) appears to preserves a plaintiff’s absolute right, it limits that 
right to a relatively early stage in the litigation.25  After a defendant has 
served an answer or a motion for summary judgment, Rule 41(a)(2) allows 
a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss a claim without prejudice only by court 
order and on conditions the court deems fair.26  Unlike a dismissal under 
Rule 41(a)(1), a dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) requires the plaintiff to file a 
motion and allows the court to attach conditions to the dismissal order.27 
Courts have broad discretion in crafting Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal 
conditions.28  For example, courts have conditioned dismissals without 
prejudice on the plaintiff’s payment of the defendant’s attorney’s costs and 
fees from the first litigation,29 refiling a subsequent action in a particular 
forum,30 excluding a particular claim from a future complaint,31 and 
producing existing discovery in a subsequent action on the same claim.32  If 
a plaintiff fails to comply with the conditions, she may not refile the 
claim.33 
 
 23. A majority of state courts have adopted versions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
41(a). See Michael E. Solimine & Amy E. Lippert, Deregulating Voluntary Dismissals, 36 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 367, app. at 406–18 (2003) (surveying the fifty states’ voluntary 
dismissal rules and statutes).  Seventeen states still follow some version of the common law 
rule. Id. 
 24. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1); see also, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1) (2016); MASS. R. 
CIV. P. 41(a)(1) (2016); UTAH R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1) (2016). 
 25. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1); see also Marques v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 286 F.3d 1014, 
1017 (7th Cir. 2002) (collecting cases interpreting Rule 41(a)(1) as giving the plaintiff an 
absolute right to voluntarily dismiss an action before a defendant serves an answer or a 
motion for summary judgment); In re Piper Aircraft Distrib. Sys. Antitrust Litig., 551 F.2d 
213, 220 (8th Cir. 1977). 
 26. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2); see also, e.g., ALASKA R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2) (2016); COLO. 
R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2) (2016); KY. R. CIV. P. 41.02 (2016). 
 27. See infra text accompanying notes 29–33. 
 28. See, e.g., LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 1976). 
 29. See, e.g., Marlow v. Winston & Strawn, 19 F.3d 300, 306 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding 
that an award of reasonable attorney’s fees incurred during the first litigation is an 
appropriate condition to dismissal without prejudice); McCants v. Ford Motor Co., 781 F.2d 
855, 859–60 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Costs may include all litigation-related expenses incurred by 
the defendant, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.”). 
 30. See, e.g., Am. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Sapulpa v. Bic Corp., 931 F.2d 1411, 1413 
(10th Cir. 1991). 
 31. See, e.g., Johnson v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-4217-NKL, 2011 WL 
6339830, at *2–3 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 19, 2011) (allowing the plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss his 
action without prejudice on the condition that he does not include a federal discrimination 
claim in a subsequent complaint). 
 32. See, e.g., Lang v. DirecTV, Inc., No. 10-1085 “G”(1), 2012 WL 733866, at *3–4 
(E.D. La. Mar. 6, 2012) (imposing the condition that plaintiff produces “all previously 
ordered discovery material” within ten days of refiling the lawsuit). 
 33. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). 
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B.  Common Factors Courts Consider When Deciding Motions 
for Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice 
Whether, and on what conditions, to grant a motion for voluntary 
dismissal without prejudice is within the “sound discretion of the trial 
court.”34  Courts use a “clear legal prejudice” standard to decide Rule 
41(a)(2) motions.35  Under this standard, courts will allow a plaintiff to 
voluntarily dismiss a claim without prejudice unless the defendant will 
suffer undue prejudice as a result.36  The goal of this analysis is to balance 
the interests of both parties.37 
There is no bright-line rule for what constitutes undue prejudice under 
this standard.  Instead, courts use a balancing test that considers the totality 
of the circumstances of each case.38  At minimum, the defendant must show 
that she will suffer prejudice beyond the mere prospect of a subsequent 
lawsuit on the same set of facts.39 
Courts consider various factors in the clear legal prejudice analysis.  
Some common factors include the defendant’s effort and expense in 
preparing for trial, any excessive delay or lack of diligence by the plaintiff, 
the adequacy of the plaintiff’s explanation for dismissal, and the extent to 
which the lawsuit has progressed.40  These factors are only guidelines and 
are not exhaustive.41  But the analysis must focus on the potential prejudice 
to the defendant, not on the convenience of the court, witnesses, or jurors.42 
 
 34. Phillips v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 874 F.2d 984, 986 (5th Cir. 1989); accord Tucker v. 
Tucker, 434 N.E.2d 1050, 1052 (N.Y. 1982); Bradshaw v. Ewing, 376 S.E.2d 264, 267 (S.C. 
1989). 
 35. E.g., Metro. Fed. Bank of Iowa, F.S.B. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 999 F.2d 1257, 1262 
(8th Cir. 1993); Phillips, 874 F.2d at 986.  Some courts use the phrase “plain legal prejudice” 
to describe the same standard. See, e.g., Wojtas v. Capital Guardian Tr. Co., 477 F.3d 924, 
927 (7th Cir. 2007); Draper v. Paul N. Gardner Defined Plan Tr., 625 A.2d 859, 863–64 
(Del. 1993); Smith v. Graham, 147 P.3d 859, 868 (Kan. 2006). 
 36. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Transamerica Ins., 665 F.2d 364, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 37. See Arias v. Cameron, 776 F.3d 1262, 1269 (11th Cir. 2015) (“While the district 
court should keep in mind the interests of the defendant, . . . the court should also weigh the 
relevant equities and do justice between the parties in each case.” (quoting McCants v. Ford 
Motor Co., 781 F.2d 855, 857 (11th Cir. 1986))). 
 38. See infra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
 39. E.g., Cone v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 217 (1947); Goodman v. 
Gordon, 447 P.2d 230, 232–33 (Ariz. 1968). 
 40. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Universal-MCA Music Publ’g, Inc., 583 F.3d 
948, 953 (6th Cir. 2009); Brown v. Baeke, 413 F.3d 1121, 1124 (10th Cir. 2005); Witzman 
v. Gross, 148 F.3d 988, 992 (8th Cir. 1998); Draper, 625 A.2d at 863–64; Aventis Pasteur, 
Inc. v. Skevofilax, 914 A.2d 113, 122 (Md. 2007) (collecting cases applying various factors); 
see also 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
§ 2364 (3d ed. 2008) (collecting cases describing the different factors each federal court of 
appeals considers). 
 41. E.g., Phillips USA, Inc. v. Allflex USA, Inc., 77 F.3d 354, 358 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 42. See, e.g., Ohlander v. Larson, 114 F.3d 1531, 1537 (10th Cir. 1997); Durham v. Fla. 
E. Coast Ry. Co., 385 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1967) (“Courts exist to serve the parties, and 
not to serve themselves, or to present a record with respect to dispatch of business.”). 
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C.  Purpose and Policy of Statutes of Limitations 
Statutes of limitations are legislative public policy decisions about the 
time period within which a plaintiff may pursue a particular claim.43  They 
provide defendants with a defense to liability in untimely lawsuits.44  
However, these time limitations vary considerably among jurisdictions.45 
Statutes of limitations serve three principal objectives.  First, they 
provide defendants with repose by eliminating the possibility of litigation 
after a reasonable period of time46 and by protecting settled expectations.47  
Second, they ensure that claims will be resolved while sufficient evidence is 
still available for the accurate disposition of cases.48  Third, they encourage 
plaintiffs to pursue claims diligently.49 
 
D.  Choice of Law:  Which Statute of Limitations Governs? 
As discussed in Part I.C, statutes of limitations vary considerably among 
jurisdictions.50  To understand when a plaintiff can dismiss a time-barred 
claim in one jurisdiction and refile it in another, this Note turns to a 
discussion on how courts determine which statute of limitations governs a 
particular claim. 
1.  State Court 
In Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,51 the U.S. Supreme Court held that each state 
must decide how to treat statutes of limitations for choice-of-law 
purposes.52  A state may choose to apply its own statute of limitations to 
claims that are otherwise governed by the substantive law of a foreign 
 
 43. See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945). 
 44. See, e.g., Phillips v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 874 F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 45. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-52 (West 2016) (providing for a three year 
statute of limitations for a breach of a written contract claim), and TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-
104 (West 2016) (providing for a one year statute of limitations for a personal injury claim), 
with WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-3-105 (West 2016) (providing for a ten year statute of limitations 
for a breach of a written contract claim), and N.D. CENT. CODE. ANN. § 28-01-16 (West 
2016) (providing for a six year statute of limitations for a personal injury claim). 
 46. See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751 (1980) (“The statute of 
limitations establishes a deadline after which . . . it is unfair to require the defendant to 
attempt to piece together his defense to an old claim.”). 
 47. See, e.g., Wm. Grayson Lambert, Focusing on Fulfilling the Goals:  Rethinking How 
Choice-of-Law Regimes Approach Statutes of Limitations, 65 SYRACUSE L. REV. 491, 500 
(2015) (“Such limitations allow society to move forward in its business, social, and political 
processes without fear of having dramatic upheavals based on judicial resolutions of old 
claims.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Barrington v. A.H. Robins Co., 702 P.2d 563, 566 (Cal. 1985). 
 49. See Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of 
Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453, 490–91 (1997) (explaining that “punishing” some plaintiffs, by 
dismissing their suits as time barred, can benefit the legal system by encouraging other 
plaintiffs to act diligently). 
 50. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 51. 486 U.S. 717 (1988). 
 52. See id. at 725–26. 
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state.53  A state may do so regardless of whether its own limitations period 
is longer or shorter than that of the state where the substantive right arose.54  
While a majority of states apply their own statutes of limitations, several 
states take different approaches.55  This Note is limited in scope to cases 
where courts will apply their own statutes of limitations. 
There are several exceptions to this general rule.  State courts will apply a 
foreign statute of limitations when a statute that creates a substantive right 
also provides a limitations period,56 a statute of limitations extinguishes a 
substantive right under the law of the state where the claim arose,57 or a 
borrowing statute applies.58 
2.  Federal Court 
In federal court, the applicable statute of limitations depends on whether 
the court is hearing a federal question claim or a diversity claim.  A court 
hearing a federal question claim will apply a federal statute of limitations 
when Congress has provided one.59  When there is no explicit limitation 
period, the applicable statute of limitations is a question of federal common 
law.60  Federal common law directs courts to look to closely analogous state 
statutes of limitations, related federal statutes of limitations, and federal 
equity doctrines.61 
A federal court hearing a diversity claim, however, will apply the same 
statute of limitations that a state court in its jurisdiction would apply.  Erie 
 
 53. See id. at 725, 730. 
 54. See id. (explaining that each state has the right to decide to apply its own shorter 
statute of limitations to protect itself from wasting judicial resources on stale claims and that 
each state also has the right to decide to apply its own longer statute of limitations when a 
remedy is no longer available in the jurisdiction where a right arose). 
 55. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2011:  
Twenty-Fifth Annual Survey, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 291, 340–42 (2012) (surveying the fifty 
states’ choice-of-law rules for statutes of limitations).  Some states have adopted the 
Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act of 1982, which applies the statute of limitations 
of the state whose substantive law governs the claim. Id.  Other states use a balancing test to 
determine which state has a stronger interest in applying its limitation period. Id.  Finally, 
several states follow section 142 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which 
presumes that the forum state’s limitations period applies but has a flexible approach for 
cases where the forum state does not have an interest in applying its own statute of 
limitations. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2015). 
 56. E.g., Price v. Litton Sys., Inc., 784 F.2d 600, 605 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 57. E.g., Walls v. Gen. Motors, Inc., 906 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 58. E.g., Combs v. Int’l Ins., 354 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2004).  A borrowing statute is a 
legislative exception to the general rule that a forum may apply its own statute of limitations. 
Id.  When the statute of limitations is shorter in the state where the substantive right arose, 
the forum state “borrows” the foreign state’s statute of limitations instead of applying its 
own. Id. 
 59. DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158–59 (1983).  Congress has 
provided a general four-year statute of limitations for federal statutes enacted after December 
1, 1990, that do not include a specific limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) (2012). 
 60. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 158–59. 
 61. Id. at 158–62; see also N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 33–34 (1995) 
(collecting federal cases borrowing state and federal statutes of limitations). 
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Railroad v. Tompkins62 requires a federal court sitting in diversity 
jurisdiction to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.63  
Statutes of limitations are “substantive” for Erie purposes.64  To determine 
which state’s statute of limitations applies, the court must apply the forum 
state’s choice-of-law rules.65 
Accordingly, in both state cases and federal diversity cases, a plaintiff 
may be able to litigate a claim that is time barred in one jurisdiction by 
filing it in another jurisdiction with a longer statute of limitations.66  To do 
this, the plaintiff must file the lawsuit in a court located in a state that 
satisfies the following requirements: 
[I]ts statute of limitations has not yet run; it will . . . apply its own longer 
statute; it will interpret its “borrowing statute,” if any, as not covering 
most cases, and thus will not borrow the shorter statute of any of the states 
with some connection to the case; [and] the defendant is amenable to 
process there.67 
This procedure is not available in federal question cases because the 
applicable statute of limitations for federal question claims does not vary 
among jurisdictions.68 
II.  THE CONFLICTING WAYS IN WHICH THE LOSS 
OF A STATUTE-OF-LIMITATIONS DEFENSE FACTORS INTO 
THE CLEAR LEGAL PREJUDICE ANALYSIS 
As discussed in Part I.C, courts generally agree that a plaintiff should be 
able to voluntarily dismiss a claim without prejudice unless the defendant 
will suffer clear legal prejudice as a result.69  Courts also agree that the 
mere prospect of a subsequent lawsuit on the same facts does not factor into 
the prejudice analysis70 and that a plaintiff’s incidental gain of a tactical 
advantage in subsequent litigation does not constitute clear legal 
 
 62. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 63. See id. at 78, 92. 
 64. See Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110–11 (1945) (holding that where a federal 
statute of limitations conflicts with a state statute of limitations, the court cannot treat the 
federal limitations period as “procedural” and thus apply it; the court must apply the state 
statute of limitations); Louise Weinberg, Choosing Law:  The Limitations Debates, 1991 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 683, 693.  Although statutes of limitations may be considered “procedural” for 
choice-of-law purposes, they are considered “substantive” for Erie purposes. Liberty 
Synergistics Inc. v. Microflo Ltd., 718 F.3d 138, 152 (2d Cir. 2013).  Such distinction exists 
because the substance-procedure dichotomy has different meanings in the two contexts. Id.  
The purpose of the substance-procedure dichotomy in the Erie context is “to 
establish . . . substantial uniformity of predictable outcome between cases tried in a federal 
court and cases tried in the courts of the State in which the federal court sits.” Id. at 153.  By 
contrast, the purpose of the substance-procedure dichotomy in the context of choice of law 
“is not to establish uniformity but to delimit spheres of state legislative competence.” Id. 
 65. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 494–97 (1941); see also 
Liberty, 718 F.3d at 151. 
 66. See, e.g., Liberty, 718 F.3d at 152. 
 67. See Weinberg, supra note 64, at 692. 
 68. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text. 
 69. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 70. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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prejudice.71  However, courts disagree about how a defendant’s loss of a 
statute-of-limitations defense should factor into the clear legal prejudice 
analysis. 
This disagreement stems from different analyses of four factors:  (1) the 
primary purpose of voluntary dismissal, (2) whether the loss of a statute-of-
limitations defense results in a subsequent lawsuit on the same facts, (3) 
whether a defendant’s loss of a statute-of-limitations defense results in the 
plaintiff’s incidental gain of a tactical advantage in subsequent litigation, 
and (4) whether curative conditions can adequately compensate a defendant 
for the loss of a statute-of-limitations defense.72  As a result, courts have 
developed two approaches to synthesize these factors.  This part discusses 
these two approaches.  Specifically, Part II.A discusses the bright-line rule 
and Part II.B discusses the balancing test. 
A.  The Bright-Line Rule 
Some courts apply a bright-line rule that a plaintiff may not voluntarily 
dismiss a time-barred claim without prejudice and refile it in another 
jurisdiction.73  Under this approach, a defendant’s loss of a statute-of-
limitations defense constitutes per se legal prejudice. It automatically 
precludes a dismissal without prejudice, and courts will not consider any 
additional factors in the clear legal prejudice analysis.74 
This rule is based on four principles.  First, the primary purpose of the 
voluntary dismissal rule is to protect the defendant from clear legal 
prejudice.75  The definition of “legal prejudice” includes material 
restrictions on a litigant’s ability to pursue her claim or defense.76  A 
defendant’s position is substantially impaired when a dismissal causes her 
to lose a statute-of-limitations defense, i.e., an absolute defense to 
liability.77  Second, the loss of a statute-of-limitations defense does not 
 
 71. See, e.g., Phillips v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 874 F.2d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 1989); McCants 
v. Ford Motor Co., 781 F.2d 855, 856–57 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 72. See supra Part II.A–B. 
 73. See, e.g., Metro. Fed. Bank of Iowa, F.S.B. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 999 F.2d 1257, 
1262 (8th Cir. 1993); Phillips, F.2d 984 at 987.  Some courts have explicitly adopted a 
bright-line rule, while others have done so implicitly.  In all of these cases, the defendant’s 
loss of a statute-of-limitations defense mechanically outweighs consideration of all the other 
factors. 
 74. See, e.g., Metro. Fed. Bank, 999 F.2d at 1262; Phillips, 874 F.2d at 987. 
 75. E.g., Grover ex rel. Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 33 F.3d 716, 718 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(“The primary purpose of [Rule 41(a)(2)] in interposing the requirement of court approval is 
to protect the nonmovant from unfair treatment.”); Fisher v. P.R. Marine Mgmt., Inc., 940 
F.2d 1502, 1503 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[W]hen exercising its discretion in considering a 
dismissal without prejudice, the court should keep in mind the interests of the defendant, for 
Rule 41(a)(2) exists chiefly for protection of defendants.”); Phillips, 874 F.2d at 987 (“When 
considering a dismissal without prejudice, the court should keep in mind the interests of the 
defendant, for it is his position which should be protected.”). 
 76. See LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 603–04 (5th Cir. 1976). 
 77. See, e.g., Phillips, 874 F.2d at 987 (“If [stripping the defendant of an absolute 
defense] does not constitute clear legal prejudice to the defendant, it is hard to envision what 
would.”); Brief for Appellants at 26, Gross v. Spies, 133 F.3d 914 (4th Cir. 1998) (Nos. 96-
2146, 96-2203, 96-2150, 96-2149, 96-2147, 96-2204) (arguing that granting voluntary 
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merely result in a subsequent lawsuit on the same facts; it results in a 
subsequent lawsuit that is fundamentally different.78  The second lawsuit 
involves a substantial new fact:  a complete defense to liability is no longer 
available.79  Third, a plaintiff’s use of voluntary dismissal to avoid an 
adverse judgment on the merits does not result in a plaintiff’s incidental 
gain of a tactical advantage—it is an abuse of a procedural rule.80  A 
plaintiff should not be allowed to “maneuver” the litigation to strip a 
defendant of an existing advantage.81  Fourth, curative conditions do not 
adequately protect the defendant from the prejudice that results from the 
loss of a statute-of-limitations defense.82  There is no amount of costs that 
can reasonably compensate a defendant for the loss of an absolute defense 
to liability.83  Courts that employ this approach routinely deny motions for 
voluntary dismissal without prejudice in the face of a valid statute-of-
limitations defense. 
Take the Fifth Circuit, for example.  In Phillips v. Illinois Central Gulf 
Railroad,84 the court adopted the bright-line rule and held that the loss of a 
statute-of-limitations defense constitutes per se legal prejudice sufficient to 
bar voluntary dismissal without prejudice.85  The court reasoned that the 
voluntary dismissal analysis should focus on protecting the interests of the 
defendant.86  Courts should not allow plaintiffs to use voluntary dismissal 
to “maneuver” the litigation and cause a defendant to lose an existing 
 
dismissal in the face of a valid statute-of-limitations defense has the same effect as if the 
court kept the action in the original forum and impermissibly denied the defendant the right 
to assert an established defense). 
 78. See, e.g., Butts ex rel. Iverson v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 802 
N.W.2d 839, 843 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (“The mere prospect of a second lawsuit is not 
sufficiently prejudicial to justify denial of a [Rule 41(a)(2)] motion to 
dismiss. . . .  [However,] a voluntary dismissal that strips a defendant of a defense that would 
otherwise be available may be sufficiently prejudicial to justify denial.”). 
 79. E.g., Phillips 874 F.2d at 987. 
 80. See, e.g., Skinner v. First Am. Bank of Va., No. 93-2493, 1995 WL 507264, at *2 
(4th Cir. Aug. 28, 1995) (“[V]oluntary dismissal without prejudice [is] improper with respect 
to claims ‘faced with imminent adverse determination in a federal action.’” (quoting Davis v. 
USX Corp., 819 F.2d 1270, 1277 (4th Cir. 1987) (Phillips, J., dissenting))); Davis, 819 F.2d 
at 1277 (Phillips, J., dissenting) (explaining that it is unfair to a defendant to allow a plaintiff 
to chose her forum, then be allowed to “bail out scot-free” and refile her claim in another 
forum after “seeing the adverse handwriting on the wall in the first chosen forum”); McCants 
v. Ford Motor Co., 781 F.2d 855, 858 (11th Cir. 1986) (denying voluntary dismissal because 
a plaintiff should not be able to avoid the “prescribed legal effect of his delays”). 
 81. E.g., Placid Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 792 F.2d 1127, 1134–35 (Temp. Emer. Ct. 
App. 1986) (denying voluntary dismissal where the plaintiff was attempting to use Rule 
41(a)(2) as a forum shopping tool to avoid the defendant’s statute-of-limitations defense); 
see also Grover ex rel. Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 33 F.3d 716, 719 (6th Cir. 1994) (“At the 
point when the law clearly dictates a result for the defendant, it is unfair to subject him to 
continued exposure to potential liability by dismissing the case without prejudice.”). 
 82. See, e.g., Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 969–71 (8th Cir. 1984). 
 83. See id. (stating that where a defendant is entitled to a judgment on the merits, there is 
no amount of costs that can compensate the defendant for the risk of continuing liability). 
 84. 874 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 85. See id. at 984. 
 86. Id. at 987. 
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advantage, such as a statute-of-limitations defense.87  Further, the second 
lawsuit would not be the same lawsuit on the same set of facts.88  The court 
explained that “the facts in the second lawsuit would differ in that the 
defendant would be stripped of an absolute defense to the suit—the 
difference between winning the case without a trial and abiding the 
unknown outcome of such a proceeding.”89 
The Eighth Circuit similarly followed this reasoning in Metropolitan 
Federal Bank of Iowa, F.S.B. v. W.R. Grace & Co.90  There, the court stated 
in dicta that it “would consider it an abuse of discretion for a district court 
to find no legal prejudice, and thus to grant voluntary dismissal, where the 
nonmoving party has demonstrated a valid statute of limitations defense to 
the claims sought to be dismissed.”91 
Likewise, in Wojtas v. Capital Guardian Trust Co.,92 the Seventh Circuit 
relied on Phillips and Metropolitan Federal Bank in holding it to be an 
abuse of discretion for a court to grant voluntary dismissal without 
prejudice when the defendant has demonstrated a valid statute-of-
limitations defense.93  Citing Phillips and Metropolitan Federal Bank, the 
court explained that a defendant acquires a legal right to assert a statute-of-
limitations defense when a plaintiff files a time-barred claim.94  Therefore, 
the defendant would suffer clear legal prejudice if the court dismissed the 
plaintiff’s claim without prejudice instead of dismissing the claim on 
statute-of-limitations grounds.95 
B.  The Balancing Test 
Other courts have rejected the bright-line rule and continue to apply their 
established balancing tests.96  Under this approach, courts consider the 
defendant’s loss of a statute-of-limitations defense as an additional factor, 
but it does not automatically outweigh the other factors.  In practice, these 
courts will allow a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss a claim without prejudice 
as long as the established clear legal prejudice factors weigh in the 
plaintiff’s favor.  While these courts purport to consider the defendant’s 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. 999 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 91. Id. at 1263.  The court did not apply the rule in this case because the defendant did 
not prove the validity of his statute-of-limitations defense. See id.  But this dicta has become 
strong precedent for subsequent cases. See e.g., Sutton-Price v. Daugherty Sys., Inc., 2012 
WL 2282344, at *3 (E.D. Mo. June 18, 2012); In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 2008 WL 
5274338, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 18, 2008). 
 92. 477 F.3d 924 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 93. The court explained that under Wisconsin law, the expiration of a statute of 
limitations “extinguishes the cause of action of the potential plaintiff and it also creates a 
right enjoyed by the would-be defendant to insist on that statutory bar.” Id. at 927 (citing 
Metro. Fed. Bank, 999 F.2d at 1263, and Phillips, 874 F.2d at 987). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. at 927–28. 
 96. See supra Part I.B. 
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loss of a statute-of-limitations defense as an additional factor, it will never 
be the deciding factor. 
Like the bright-line rule, this approach is also based on four principles.  
First, the primary purpose of the voluntary dismissal rule is to preserve 
plaintiffs’ claims by allowing them to “start over” and to compensate the 
defendant for duplicative costs and efforts.97  Forcing a plaintiff to suffer 
for her lawyer’s error of filing a claim in a jurisdiction where the action is 
time barred contradicts strong public policy in favor of deciding cases on 
their merits.98  Because a dismissal with prejudice ends a plaintiff’s claim, 
it is considered a “sanction of last resort”99 and is inappropriate in cases 
where the plaintiff has acted diligently and in good faith.100  Second, while 
a defendant’s loss of a statute-of-limitations defense may result in the 
inconvenience of a second lawsuit, it does not alter the underlying facts that 
give rise to the claim.101  Third, when a defendant loses a statute-of-
limitations defense, she merely loses a tactical advantage while the plaintiff 
gains one incidentally.102  When a plaintiff’s lawyer files a time-barred 
claim, the defendant does not acquire a vested interest in that jurisdiction; 
 
 97. See, e.g., McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1184 (7th Cir. 1985) (“As . . . the 
language and history of Rule 41(a) imply, the general purpose of the rule is to preserve the 
plaintiff’s right to take a voluntary nonsuit and start over so long as the defendant is not 
hurt.”); LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 1976) (explaining that the 
purpose of Rule 41(a)(2) is to “freely permit the plaintiff, with court approval, to voluntarily 
dismiss an action [without prejudice]” where dismissal will not result in injustice to the 
defendant). 
 98. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 646–49 (1962) (Black, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that while penalizing a plaintiff for his lawyer’s errors may reduce a court’s 
docket, it “undercuts the very purposes for which courts were created—that is, to try cases 
on their merits and render judgments in accordance with the substantial rights of the 
parties”); see also id. (“[A plaintiff should not be] awakened to his lawyer’s incapacity for 
the first time by a sudden brutal pronouncement of the court:  ‘Your lawyer has failed to 
perform his duty . . . and we are therefore throwing you out of court on your heels.’”); 
Germain v. Semco Serv. Mach. Co., 79 F.R.D. 85, 86 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (“[L]itigants 
generally ought not to be disadvantaged by such errors of counsel.”). 
 99. See Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985).  While Goforth is a 
case about a Rule 41(b) dismissal for failure to prosecute, see FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b), the same 
reasoning is applicable in the context of Rule 41(a) dismissals.  In both contexts, the court 
exercises discretion about whether to dismiss the claim with or without prejudice. See FED. 
R. CIV. P. 41(a)–(b).  Both inquiries ask whether the defendant will be unfairly prejudiced by 
a dismissal without prejudice. Compare Rogers v. Kroger Co., 669 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 
1982) (conducting a Rule 41(b) inquiry and citing cases that consider responsibility of the 
plaintiff, intentional conduct, and prejudice to the defendant), with McCants v. Ford Motor 
Co., 781 F.2d 855, 858–59 (11th Cir. 1986) (conducting a Rule 41(a)(2) inquiry and 
considering factors such as responsibility of the plaintiff, intentional conduct, and prejudice 
to the defendant). 
 100. See, e.g., McCants, 781 F.2d at 859. 
 101. See, e.g., Arias v. Cameron, 776 F.3d 1262, 1274 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting that the 
loss of a statute-of-limitations does not change the subject matter of the lawsuit). 
 102. See McCants, 781 F.2d at 859 (holding that although “the plaintiff’s untimeliness 
yielded the defendant a potentially great legal advantage” in the first forum that the 
defendant would presumably lose in a subsequent lawsuit on the same claim, the defendant 
did not suffer any clear legal prejudice as a result of such loss); see, e.g., Arias, 776 F.3d at 
1271. 
802 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
the defendant acquires a procedural advantage.103  Finally, curative 
conditions adequately protect the defendant from the inconvenience of a 
subsequent lawsuit.104  Courts have broad discretion in attaching conditions 
to voluntary dismissal orders.105  The “extreme” sanction of dismissal with 
prejudice is appropriate only in cases where lesser protections would not 
serve the interests of justice.106  Courts that follow this approach routinely 
grant motions for voluntary dismissal without prejudice even in the face of 
a valid statute-of-limitations defense. 
The Eleventh Circuit, for example, has expressly rejected a bright-line 
rule in this context.107  In McCants v. Ford Motor Co.,108 the court held that 
the loss of a valid statute-of-limitations defense does not bar a dismissal 
without prejudice.109  Instead, the court applied its established balancing 
test and reasoned that the loss of a valid statute-of-limitations defense 
merely results in “a second lawsuit on the same set of facts.”110  The court 
found it significant that the plaintiff had acted diligently and that there was 
no evidence of bad faith.111  Under these circumstances, the court found 
that the defendant would not suffer clear legal prejudice as the result of a 
dismissal without prejudice.112 
Similarly, the Southern District of New York granted the plaintiff’s 
motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice in Klar v. Firestone Tire 
& Rubber Co.113  Here, the plaintiff moved for voluntary dismissal because 
he believed his claim was time-barred in New York, and he wanted to refile 
 
 103. See Germain, 79 F.R.D. at 86 (rejecting defendant’s claim of prejudice, stating that a 
defendant does not acquire a vested interest when plaintiff’s counsel files a lawsuit in a 
jurisdiction where the statute of limitations has expired). 
 104. See, e.g., McCants, 781 F.2d at 860 (explaining that ordinarily a court will not allow 
a plaintiff to dismiss an action without prejudice after the defendant has been put to 
considerable expense and effort, except on conditions that compensate the defendant for 
such time and effort). 
 105. See Diamond v. United States, 267 F.2d 23, 25 (5th Cir. 1959) (holding that a district 
court’s Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal order is only reviewable for abuse of discretion); supra note 
15 and accompanying text. 
 106. See, e.g., Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding dismissal 
with prejudice was appropriate where the plaintiff “engaged in a pattern of delay and 
deliberately refused to comply with the directions of the court” because any lesser sanction 
would not have served the interests of justice). 
 107. See Arias, 776 F.3d at 1274–75 (“We recognize . . . that other circuits have found 
clear legal prejudice to exist when a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal is granted in the face of a valid 
statute-of-limitations defense. . . .  [However,] a per se rule prohibiting district courts from 
allowing dismissals without prejudice . . . could significantly undermine the district court’s 
ability to balance the equities in ruling on a motion for voluntary dismissal under Rule 
41(a)(2).”); McCants, 781 F.2d at 858–59 (holding that the loss of a statute-of-limitations 
defense does not constitute clear legal prejudice and, without more, should not preclude 
dismissal without prejudice). 
 108. 781 F.2d 855 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 109. See id. at 859. 
 110. Id.  In reaching its decision, the Eleventh Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the 
action was time barred in Alabama. See id. at 858. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 857–58. 
 113. 14 F.R.D. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
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the action in Ohio, where a longer statute of limitations would apply.114  
The court explained that Rule 41(a)(2) was enacted to protect defendants 
from abusive practices of plaintiffs who filed lawsuits with “no real object 
in mind” other than putting defendants to significant expenses.115  Absent a 
finding of abusive intent, the court granted voluntary dismissal conditioned 
on (1) the refiling of the action in Ohio and (2) the plaintiff’s payment of 
costs and attorney’s fees.116 
Germain v. Semco Service Machine Co.117 provides another example of 
the balancing test approach.  Here, the plaintiff moved for voluntary 
dismissal for the express purpose of refiling the action in New Jersey, 
where a longer statute of limitations would apply.118  In its prejudice 
analysis, the court focused on the aspect of duplicative effort rather than 
potential abusive intent.119  The court explained that “[t]he further along a 
case has proceeded, the more the prejudice to the defendant in granting the 
plaintiff’s motion to dismiss.”120  Because the case was in the preliminary 
stages of discovery, the court found that little duplicative effort would result 
from the voluntary dismissal in New York and the refiling in New 
Jersey.121  The court granted voluntary dismissal conditioned on the 
plaintiff’s agreement to make available discovery from the first proceeding 
and to pay opposing counsel’s costs and attorney’s fees.122 
The court in Ross v. Raymark Industries, Inc.123 also applied the 
balancing test approach but for different reasons.  The Pennsylvania court 
explained that even if it granted the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment, the plaintiff could still proceed with a subsequent New Jersey 
action because the doctrine of res judicata would not apply to a statute-of-
limitations dismissal.124  Further, the court explained that if it allowed a 
dismissal without prejudice, it could attach curative conditions to the 
dismissal order, thus the defendants would be protected from duplicative 
expenses.125  If, however, the court granted the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment, the defendants would bear the expenses for both the 
Pennsylvania action and the subsequent New Jersey action.126 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 176–77. 
 117. 79 F.R.D. 85 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). 
 118. Id. at 86. 
 119. Id. at 86–87. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 87. 
 122. Id. 
 123. No. 84-3663, 1985 WL 5035 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1985). 
 124. See id. at *2 (“Dismissal of an action on limitations grounds merely bars the remedy 
in the first system of courts, and leaves [a] second system of courts free to grant a remedy 
that is not barred by its own rules of limitations.”). 
 125. See id. 
 126. See id. 
804 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
III.  THE SOLUTION THROUGH PRECLUSION:  
RES JUDICATA AS A THRESHOLD INQUIRY 
This part argues that courts overlook a fundamental factor in deciding 
whether to dismiss a time-barred claim without prejudice.  Specifically, 
they do not consider what the claim-preclusive effect of a statute-of-
limitations dismissal would be, which is a vital consideration to accurately 
balance the parties’ interests in the clear legal prejudice analysis. 
Part III.A explains how the claim-preclusive effect of a statute-of-
limitations dismissal varies based on the jurisdiction that renders a 
judgment.  Part III.B proposes that, as a threshold inquiry, courts should 
determine whether a statute-of-limitations dismissal would be claim 
preclusive.  Based on this determination, courts can accurately assess how a 
dismissal without prejudice will affect the parties’ interests and whether 
such dismissal is warranted. 
A.  The Preclusive (or Nonpreclusive) Effect of  
Statute-of-Limitations Dismissals 
The doctrine of res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, provides 
that a “final judgment, rendered upon the merits by a court having 
jurisdiction . . . is a complete bar to a new suit between [the parties] on the 
same cause of action.”127  Courts disagree about whether statute-of-
limitations dismissals are judgments “on the merits,” and, therefore, in 
some jurisdictions such dismissals are claim preclusive while in others they 
are not. 
In state court, the preclusion law of the state that renders a judgment 
governs the claim-preclusive effect of that judgment.128  States are divided 
about whether statute-of-limitations dismissals are claim preclusive—some 
states preclude a plaintiff from refiling the claim elsewhere and other states 
do not. 
In federal court, federal common law governs the claim-preclusive effect 
of a judgment.129  In federal question cases, statute-of-limitations dismissals 
are claim preclusive.130  But in diversity cases, the state law in the 
jurisdiction where the federal court sits governs the preclusive effect of a 
judgment.131 
 
 127. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 502 (2001). 
 128. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires every state to give 
a foreign state’s judgment the same preclusive effect it would be accorded by the state that 
rendered the judgment. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.  The Full Faith and Credit Statute 
requires every federal court to give a state court judgment the same preclusive effect it 
would be accorded by the state that rendered the judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012). 
 129. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507 (explaining that under federal common law, both state and 
federal courts must give a federal court judgment the preclusive effect prescribed by federal 
law). 
 130. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 228 (1995). 
 131. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508. 
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1.  The Effect of Statute-of-Limitations Dismissals 
That Are Not Claim Preclusive 
In states where statute-of-limitations dismissals are not claim preclusive, 
a statute-of-limitations dismissal does not bar a plaintiff from refiling her 
claim.132  In these states, statute-of-limitations dismissals are not claim 
preclusive because they are not judgments “on the merits.”133  As a matter 
of issue preclusion, however, a statute-of-limitations dismissal will bar the 
plaintiff from refiling the lawsuit in any court in the state where the 
judgment was rendered.134 
This rule reflects the traditional view that statutes of limitations are 
procedural devices.  They limit a plaintiff’s ability to obtain a remedy in a 
particular court system,135 but they do not extinguish the underlying 
substantive claim.136  In these jurisdictions, a dismissal on statute-of-
limitations grounds is “a judgment on the procedural merits, not the 
substantive merits.”137 
2.  The Effect of Statute-of-Limitations Dismissals 
That Are Claim Preclusive 
In other states, statute-of-limitations dismissals are claim preclusive.  In 
these jurisdictions, a statute-of-limitations dismissal bars the plaintiff from 
refiling the action anywhere.138  These states treat statute-of-limitations 
dismissals as judgments “on the merits.”139  Under this approach, the 
 
 132. See id. at 504–06. 
 133. See, e.g., Ray & Sons Masonry Contractors, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 114 
S.W.3d 189, 197 (Ark. 2003); Advest Inc. v. Wachtel, 668 A.2d 367, 371 (Conn. 1995); 
Stewart ex rel. K.B. v. G.M., 490 N.W.2d 715, 717 (N.D. 1992); Green v. Siegel, Barnett & 
Schutz, 557 N.W.2d 396, 405 (S.D. 1996). 
 134. Issue preclusion “bars successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually 
litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment.” Taylor 
v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 
(2001)).  Unlike claim preclusion, issue preclusion does not require a judgment “on the 
merits.” See id.  The issue that is resolved by a statute-of-limitations dismissal is that the 
statute of limitations in the state that rendered the judgment has expired. See, e.g., Advest, 
Inc., 668 A.2d at 371 (“Although a judgment based on the running of the statute of 
limitations bars the plaintiff from bringing an action to relitigate the claim within that 
jurisdiction, it is not a judgment on the merits and does not erase the plaintiff’s claim.”). 
 135. For example, a judgment may preclude a plaintiff from obtaining a remedy from any 
court in one state’s court system, but it does not preclude the plaintiff from obtaining a 
remedy from a court in another state’s court system or a court in the federal court system. 
 136. See, e.g., Gomez v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 71 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Ark. 2002); 
Albrecht v. Gen. Motors Corp., 648 N.W.2d 87, 91 (Iowa 2002); Griffin v. BSFI W. E & P, 
Inc., 812 So. 2d 726, 732 (La. Ct. App. 2002). 
 137. E.g., Griffin, 812 So. 2d at 732. 
 138. See e.g., Allie v. Ionata, 503 So. 2d 1237, 1241 (Fla. 1987) (“An adjudication based 
upon the running of a statute of limitation, as a bar to further action, is just such a judgment 
on the merits.” (quoting Creech v. Town of Walkerton, 472 N.E.2d 226, 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1984))). 
 139. See, e.g., Montaño v. Browning, 48 P.3d 494, 496 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); Towe v. 
Connors, 644 S.E.2d 176, 178 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 665 
N.E.2d 1199, 1204–05 (Ill. 1996); N. Am. Specialty Ins. v. Bos. Med. Grp., 906 A.2d 1042, 
1050 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006). 
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dismissal extinguishes both the plaintiff’s ability to obtain a remedy and the 
underlying substantive right.140 
States have departed from the traditional view and adopted this rule for 
various reasons.  In some states, the rule is based on a narrow interpretation 
of state rules that parallel Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), which 
governs the effect of involuntary dismissals.141  Rule 41(b) provides that, 
“unless the dismissal order states otherwise,” an involuntary dismissal 
operates as a judgment “on the merits,” except if dismissed for (1) lack of 
jurisdiction, (2) lack of venue, or (3) failure to join a party under Rule 
19.142  Because a statute-of-limitations dismissal is not one of the 
enumerated exceptions, some states have decided that it operates as a 
judgment on the merits.143  In other states, the rule is written into the statute 
itself.  These statutes explicitly state that the expiration of the limitations 
period extinguishes both the remedy and the right.144 
B.  The Missing Factor 
in the Clear Legal Prejudice Analysis:  Res Judicata 
The differences in state preclusion law create significant differences in 
what it means for a defendant to lose the ability to assert a statute-of-
limitations defense.  In jurisdictions where statute-of-limitations dismissals 
are not claim preclusive, a defendant will be subject to a subsequent lawsuit 
whether a court dismisses the plaintiff’s initial claim without prejudice or 
on statute-of-limitations grounds.145  Thus, the defendant’s interests are not 
substantially impaired by the “loss” of a statute-of-limitations defense.  But 
in jurisdictions where statute-of-limitations dismissals are claim preclusive, 
a court’s decision to dismiss without prejudice can substantially impair a 
defendant’s interests.146  A defendant would not be subject to a subsequent 
lawsuit if the court dismissed the claim on statute-of-limitations grounds.  
But if the court dismisses without prejudice, the defendant can be haled into 
court upon the plaintiff’s refiling in a different jurisdiction. 
To fairly balance the interests of the parties, the clear legal prejudice 
analysis should reflect the totality of the circumstances.147  Both the bright-
line rule and the balancing test fail to do so as they are currently applied.  
The bright-line rule is based on the faulty premise that statute-of-limitations 
dismissals are always claim preclusive.  As such, the bright-line rule is 
misleading and inefficient in jurisdictions where statute-of-limitations 
dismissals are not claim preclusive.  The balancing test is equally 
problematic because it fails to consider the significance (or lack thereof) of 
 
 140. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.05 (West 2015). 
 141. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b), with S.C. R. CIV. P. 41(b), and COLO. R. CIV. P. 
41(b). 
 142. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). 
 143. E.g., Washington v. Sinai Hosp. of Greater Detroit, 733 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Mich. 
2007).  This approach follows the federal court approach. 
 144. E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.05. 
 145. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 146. See supra notes 138–40 and accompanying text. 
 147. Arias v. Cameron, 776 F.3d 1262, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2015). 
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the loss of a statute-of-limitations defense.  It does not resolve, and 
therefore cannot balance, how the loss of a statute-of-limitations defense 
would affect the defendant’s interests.  This approach is inefficient in 
jurisdictions where statute-of-limitations dismissals are claim preclusive. 
Given the variations in preclusion law, neither approach should be 
uniformly applied.148  Rather, courts should conduct a threshold inquiry 
into whether a statute-of-limitations dismissal would be claim preclusive.149  
When a statute-of-limitations dismissal would not be claim preclusive, 
courts should use their established balancing tests to decide whether to 
dismiss a claim without prejudice.  A defendant’s loss of a statute-of-
limitations defense should not factor into the analysis.  On the other hand, 
when a statute-of-limitations dismissal would be claim preclusive, courts 
should apply the bright-line rule and dismiss the claim on statute-of-
limitations grounds. 
1.  When Courts Should Use the Bright-Line Rule 
When a statute-of-limitations dismissal is claim preclusive, it has a 
fundamentally different effect than a dismissal without prejudice:  the 
plaintiff cannot refile the lawsuit in another jurisdiction even if a longer 
statute of limitations would apply elsewhere.  In these jurisdictions, a 
statute-of-limitations dismissal provides the defendant with an absolute 
defense to liability.150  Thus, a defendant’s interests are substantially 
impaired when she loses the ability to assert that defense.  In these 
jurisdictions, the courts or the legislatures have decided that a defendant 
acquires a right to an absolute defense when a plaintiff files a time-barred 
claim.  A defendant’s right to assert a statute-of-limitations defense is 
equivalent to a plaintiff’s right to assert a substantive claim.151  This leads 
to the question:  Who should suffer, the plaintiff who mistakenly files a 
time-barred claim or the defendant who is forced into court against her will? 
Even at common law, where plaintiffs had an absolute right to 
voluntarily dismiss their claims prior to judgment or verdict, courts denied 
voluntary dismissal in cases where the defendant was entitled to a judgment 
on the merits.152  In jurisdictions where statute-of-limitations dismissals are 
claim preclusive, the defendant is entitled to a judgment on the merits when 
a plaintiff files a time-barred claim.  A plaintiff should not be able to use a 
 
 148. This issue is particularly problematic when a federal circuit court adopts one 
approach because it is binding on all of the district courts within that circuit.  For example, 
the Fifth Circuit includes district courts in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.  In Louisiana, 
statute-of-limitations dismissals are not claim preclusive. See Griffin v. BSFI W. E & P, Inc., 
812 So. 2d 726, 732 (La. Ct. App. 2002). 
 149. See Ross v. Raymark Indus., Inc., No. 84-3663, 1985 WL 5035 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 
1985).  This approach assumes the defendant has a valid statute-of-limitations defense.  If 
there is a dispute about whether a claim is time barred, that should be resolved before the 
voluntary dismissal issue. 
 150. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 151. See Brief for Appellants at 26, Gross v. Spies, 133 F.3d 914 (4th Cir. 1998) (Nos. 
96-2146, 96-2203, 96-2150, 96-2149, 96-2147, 96-2204). 
 152. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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procedural rule to avoid an adverse judgment on the merits.  Further, there 
is no amount of costs that can adequately compensate a defendant for the 
loss of an absolute defense to liability.153  Therefore, in these jurisdictions, 
there is no need to balance any factors; the loss of a statute-of-limitations 
defense constitutes per se legal prejudice sufficient to bar a dismissal 
without prejudice. 
Recall in McCants, the Eleventh Circuit held that the loss of a statute-of-
limitations defense alone does not constitute clear legal prejudice.154  The 
court emphasized that the plaintiff had acted diligently and that there was 
no evidence of bad faith.155  The court found that the loss of a valid statute-
of-limitations defense would merely result in a subsequent lawsuit on the 
same facts, and therefore the defendant would not suffer clear legal 
prejudice as a result of a dismissal without prejudice.156  This action, 
however, arose in Alabama and the court failed to consider that statute-of-
limitations dismissals are claim preclusive in that state.157  If the court 
dismissed the claim on statute-of-limitations grounds, the defendant would 
be completely absolved from liability. 
Similarly in Klar and Germain, the district courts granted the plaintiffs’ 
motions for voluntary dismissal without prejudice.158  The courts based 
their decisions on the lack of evidence of abusive intent on the part of the 
plaintiffs and on the immaturity of the case.159  Still, the courts failed to 
consider the claim-preclusive effect of statute-of-limitations dismissals in 
New York.  While New York preclusion law may not have been settled 
when these cases were decided, the state now holds that statute-of-
limitations dismissals are claim preclusive.160  Nonetheless, courts in 
various jurisdictions continue to cite Klar and Germain for the proposition 
that the loss of a statute-of-limitations defense alone is not sufficient to bar 
voluntary dismissal without prejudice.161 
These decisions have cemented bad precedent in jurisdictions where 
statute-of-limitations dismissals are not claim preclusive.  These courts do 
 
 153. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 154. McCants v. Ford Motor Co., 781 F.2d 855, 859 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See Clothier v. Counseling, Inc., 875 So. 2d 1198, 1200 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) 
(citing Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 228 (1995) (holding a dismissal on 
statute-of-limitations grounds is a dismissal on the merits for purposes of claim preclusion)). 
 158. See Germain v. Semco Serv. Mach. Co., 79 F.R.D. 85, 87 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Klar v. 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 14 F.R.D. 176, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
 159. See Germain, 79 F.R.D. at 87; Klar, 14 F.R.D. at 176. 
 160. Smith v. Russell Sage Coll., 429 N.E.2d 746, 750 (N.Y. 1981) (holding that a 
dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds is “sufficiently close to the merits for claim 
preclusion purposes to bar a second action”). 
 161. See, e.g., McCants, 781 F.2d at 858; Greguski v. Long Island R.R., 163 F.R.D. 221, 
224 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Klar for the proposition that “the fact that the movant seeks a 
dismissal to take advantage of a more favorable limitations period by subsequently filing suit 
in a different court should not bar the dismissal”); Bamdad Mech. Co. v. United Techs. 
Corp., 109 F.R.D. 128, 131–32 (D. Del. 1985). 
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not account for the substantial prejudice to the defendant that results from a 
dismissal without prejudice.162 
2.  When Courts Should Use the Balancing Test 
When a statute-of-limitations dismissal is not claim preclusive, it has 
largely the same effect as a dismissal without prejudice:  the plaintiff can 
refile the claim in a jurisdiction with a longer statute of limitations.  The 
only notable difference is that, as a matter of issue preclusion, a statute-of-
limitations dismissal will bar the plaintiff from refiling the action in the 
original jurisdiction, while a dismissal without prejudice will not.163  When 
a plaintiff seeks a dismissal without prejudice for the express purpose of 
refiling the action elsewhere, the only logical conclusion is that the plaintiff 
will not refile the action in the original forum.  In fact, a court can ensure 
that the plaintiff will not refile the action in the original forum by imposing 
a curative condition to that effect.164  When a court enters judgment for the 
defendant on statute-of-limitations grounds, the court cannot impose 
curative conditions to protect the defendant from duplicative costs and 
efforts.165  The defendant is left subject to a second lawsuit at her own 
expense.166 
In these jurisdictions, courts should use their established clear legal 
prejudice balancing tests to determine whether a dismissal without 
prejudice is warranted.  Courts should not consider a defendant’s loss of a 
statute-of-limitations defense as an additional factor because the 
defendant’s interests are not impaired as a result of a dismissal without 
prejudice.167  The defendant will be subject to another lawsuit even if the 
court dismisses the claim on statute-of-limitations grounds.168 
 
 162. The Seventh Circuit skirted around the res judicata factor in Wojtas.  In Wojtas, the 
court noted that in Wisconsin the expiration of the statute of limitations extinguishes both the 
remedy and the right to bring the substantive claim. See Wojtas v. Capital Guardian Tr. Co., 
477 F.3d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 2007).  The court therefore concluded that the defendant would 
suffer clear legal prejudice as a result of a dismissal without prejudice. Id. at 927–28.  While 
this decision is sound, the court did not adequately explain its reasoning.  The court cited 
Phillips and Metropolitan Federal Bank for the proposition that it is an abuse of discretion to 
allow voluntary dismissal without prejudice when the defendant would lose a statute-of-
limitations defense. Id.  Courts have interpreted this as a bright-line rule in the Seventh 
Circuit rather than a narrow decision based on Wisconsin’s preclusion law. See, e.g., Arias v. 
Cameron, 776 F.3d 1262, 1274 (11th Cir. 2015); Butts ex rel. Iverson v. Evangelical 
Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 802 N.W.2d 839, 843 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
 163. Compare, Advest, Inc. v. Wachtel, 668 A.2d 367, 371 (Conn. 1995) (holding that as 
a matter of issue preclusion, a judgment on statute-of-limitations grounds in Connecticut is 
not on the merits and only precludes the plaintiff from relitigating the issue of whether the 
Connecticut statute of limitations has run; “[i]n other words, the prior action renders the 
issue of Connecticut’s statute of limitations subject to the doctrine of issue preclusion”), with 
LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 1976) (explaining that a dismissal 
without prejudice puts the plaintiff in the legal position as if he never filed the lawsuit). 
 164. See Ross v. Raymark Indus., Inc., No. 84-3663, 1985 WL 5035, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 
30, 1985). 
 165. See id. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See, e.g., Durham v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 385 F.2d 366, 368–69 (5th Cir. 1967). 
 168. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 499 (2001). 
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When a dismissal without prejudice is warranted under the standard 
balancing test, these courts should allow the plaintiff to dismiss her claim 
without prejudice so she can refile it in a jurisdiction where a longer statute 
of limitations will apply.  When a dismissal without prejudice is not 
warranted under the standard balancing test, courts should dismiss the 
action with prejudice, not on statute-of-limitations grounds.169 
Recall in Phillips, the Fifth Circuit held that a defendant’s loss of a 
statute-of-limitations defense constitutes per se legal prejudice sufficient to 
bar dismissal without prejudice.170  The court emphasized that a voluntary 
dismissal without prejudice would cause the defendant to lose an absolute 
defense.171  The court overlooked the fact that statute-of-limitations 
dismissals are not claim preclusive in Louisiana, where the action 
originated.172  In other words, a statute-of-limitations defense is not an 
absolute defense in Louisiana.  This holding is misleading because it is 
based on the faulty premise that dismissals on statute-of-limitations grounds 
are always claim preclusive.  It assumes that a statute-of-limitations defense 
provides defendants with an absolute defense to liability.  The plaintiff 
could have refiled his claim in another jurisdictions despite the court’s 
dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds.173  But the language and 
reasoning in the opinion misled the plaintiff to believe his claim was 
extinguished.  This decision is similarly inefficient because if the plaintiff 
does refile the action in another jurisdiction, the defendant has no protection 
from duplicative costs and efforts.174 
This flawed reasoning has developed bad precedent in jurisdictions 
where statute-of-limitations dismissals are not claim preclusive.  These 
courts fail to adequately balance the interests of the parties. 
CONCLUSION 
The voluntary dismissal analysis should account for the individual 
circumstances of each case.  When a plaintiff seeks to voluntarily dismiss a 
time-barred claim without prejudice to refile it in another jurisdiction, a 
court must consider the impact such action would have on the defendant’s 
interests.  A court cannot do so without resolving what it means for a 
defendant to lose the ability to assert a statute-of-limitations defense in a 
subsequent lawsuit.  Courts can make this determination by resolving 
whether a statute-of-limitations dismissal would be claim preclusive under 
the applicable state law.  This determines whether the loss of a statute-of-
limitations defense would substantially harm the defendant’s interests and, 
 
 169. A dismissal with prejudice will preclude the plaintiff from refiling the action, while a 
statute-of-limitations dismissal will not. 
 170. See Phillips v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 874 F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 171. See id. 
 172. See Griffin v. BSFI W. E & P, Inc., 812 So. 2d 726, 731–32 (La. Ct. App. 2002). 
 173. See supra Part III.A.1; see also Semtek, 531 U.S. at 499 (explaining that in a 
jurisdiction where statute-of-limitations dismissals are not claim preclusive, a defendant 
remains subject to liability in another jurisdiction even if the court purports to dismiss a 
claim on statute-of-limitations grounds “in [its] entirety on the merits and with prejudice”). 
 174. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text. 
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thus, whether the court should proceed with a bright-line rule or balancing 
test. 
In jurisdictions where statute-of-limitations dismissals are not claim 
preclusive, the loss of a statute-of-limitations defense does not substantially 
impact the defendant’s interests.  In these jurisdictions, courts should allow 
a plaintiff to dismiss a claim without prejudice so long as other factors 
weigh in favor of doing so.  By contrast, in jurisdictions where statute-of-
limitations dismissals are claim preclusive, the loss of a statute-of-
limitations defense substantially impairs a defendant’s interests.  In these 
jurisdictions, courts should not allow a plaintiff to dismiss a claim without 
prejudice.  Instead, they should enter judgment for the defendant by either 
dismissing the action with prejudice or dismissing the claim on statute-of-
limitations grounds.  Such a framework would help to alleviate the 
inefficiencies perpetuated by the current approaches courts use to resolve 
motions for voluntary dismissal of time-barred claims. 
